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THE NEED FOR FAIR TRIALS DOES
NOT JUSTIFY A DISCIPLINARY
RULE THAT BROADLY RESTRICTS
AN ATTORNEY'S SPEECH
Committee on ProfessionalResponsibility, Association of
the Bar of the City of New York t
The degree to which limits can be placed on extrajudicial speech by
attorneys during potential and pending criminal cases has long been
the subject of debate. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Gentile
v. State Bar of Nevada,' has intensified that debate and makes clear
that New York's ethical restriction is in serious need of revision.
I. The Competing Interests
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the justice
system, and particularly the criminal courts, play a critical role in a
democratic state and that the public has a legitimate interest in their
operations. 2 Indeed, the Court has stated that "it would be difficult to
single out any aspect of government of higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
conducted." 3
At the same time, the Court has characterized the right to a fair
trial as "the most fundamental of all freedoms," 4 and accordingly has
stated that when the exercise of First Amendment rights jeopardizes
the right to a fair trial, the exercise of First Amendment rights must
be limited.5 In cases involving the First Amendment rights of the
press, the Court has balanced those competing interests by requiring
the showing of a "clear and present danger" to the fairness of a proceeding before the state may prohibit or punish publication of reports
about that proceeding. 6
An additional set of competing interests is present when the First
t April 1992. The members of the Committee at the time this report was written
are listed in Appendix A.
1. 111 S. Ct. 2720 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
3. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 575.
4. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
5. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966); Estes, 381 U.S. at 539.
6. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941).
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Amendment freedoms at issue are those of an attorney who is involved in the proceeding. Many have argued that because an attorney
is in a unique position to discover, interpret, and reveal the operations
of the legal system (and its defects), the public has a fundamental
right to such information from the attorney. Those who espouse this
view, such as the petitioner in Gentile, argue forcefully against restrictions on the attorney's speech. Others have countered, however, that
because lawyers have special fiduciary responsibilities to the judicial
system, and because their special access to information makes it likelier that their extrajudicial statements could undermine the fairness of
a trial, special restrictions are appropriate. Indeed, citing the latter
considerations, the Supreme Court has long suggested that lawyers in
pending cases are subject to restrictions on speech which could not be
constitutionally applied to the press or to an ordinary citizen.7
Until Gentile, however, the Court did not have occasion to rule on
how onerous those restrictions could be. When it did, the result was a
sharply divided set of opinions with shifting majorities.
II.

The Gentile Case

In Gentile, the State Bar of Nevada filed a complaint against an
attorney alleging a violation of Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, a
rule governing trial publicity almost identical to ABA Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.6 and New York's Disciplinary Rule 7-107.1
Subsection (1) of Nevada Rule 177 prohibited an attorney from making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 9 Subsection (2) of the rule listed a number of statements that were considered
to be "ordinarily... likely" to result in material prejudice."° Subsec7. See Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 363; In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 635 (1959); see also
Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) (state prohibition on in-person solicitation by an
accountant violates the First Amendment, even though a similar restriction against lawyers is constitutional: "Unlike a lawyer, a CPA is not trained in the art of persuasion.").
8. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 1200 (1992) [hereinafter N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
9. Gentile, 111 S.Ct. at 2723.
10. The following matters were listed in the rule as ordinarily prejudicial: (1) the
character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness, or the expected testimony of a party or
witness; (2) in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession,
admission, or statement given by a'defendant or suspect or that person's refusal or failure
to make a statement; (3) the performance or results of any examination or test or the
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tion (3) of the rule provided a safe harbor provision for an attorney,
listing a number of statements that can be made without fear of discipline, including a statement about the "general nature of the defense,"
so long as it was made "without elaboration."'I
Gentile's client was the criminal defendant in a highly publicized
case involving the theft of large amounts of cocaine and travelers
checks from a safety deposit vault. The drugs and money had been
used as part of an undercover operation conducted by the Las Vegas
Police Department's Intelligence Bureau. The defendant was the
owner of the safety deposit vault in question. Prior to the indictment
there was substantial press coverage of the investigation in which the
press reported that through a process of elimination the investigation
was narrowing down to focus on the defendant, who was identified by
name. The press also reported that the two detectives with access to
the vault had been "cleared" as possible suspects after taking lie detector tests.
In response to this adverse publicity about his client, Gentile held a
press conference on the day after indictment.' 2 Before the press conference, Gentile carefully studied Rule 177 and its safe harbor provisions, in order to determine if he could issue an ethically permissible
statement.' 3 At the press conference, Gentile contended that the state
sought the indictment and conviction of an innocent man as a "scapegoat" and "had not been honest enough to indict the people who did
it... crooked cops."' 4 The allegedly "crooked cops" were obviously
witnesses who would testify at trial. Articles appeared in the local
refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature
of physical evidence expected to be presented; (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of a defendant or suspect in a criminal case or proceeding that could result in incarceration; (5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be admissible as evidence in a trial and would if disclosed create a substantial risk of prejudicing an
impartial trial; or (6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there
is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and
that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty. Gentile, 111 S.
Ct. at 2737-38.
11. The Nevada rule, which was challenged and held unconstitutional in part in Gentile, has been redrafted and is currently pending before the Nevada Supreme Court. Ironically, the chief draftsperson for the amended rule was Gentile himself, who is currently
the Nevada State Bar Governor. See Don J. DeBenedectis, Gentile's Unanswered Questions, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 28. The proposed revision in Nevada drops the safe harbor
provision as well as the list of presumptively prejudicial statements, and also grants a
lawyer a "right of reply" to publicity initiated by others.
12. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2723.
13. Id. at 2732.
14. Id. at 2723.
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press describing Gentile's comments. The trial took place six months
later and the defendant was acquitted on all charges.
The Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board subsequently found that
Gentile's pretrial comments had violated Nevada State Court Rule
177. In so finding, the Board stated that in light of the nature, timing
and purpose of the statements, Gentile knew or should have known
that there was a "substantial likelihood that the statements would materially prejudice the [defendant's] trial."' 5 The Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the Board's decision."
Gentile urged the United States Supreme Court to reverse the decision, arguing 1) that Nevada State Court Rule 177 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him, and 2) that by punishing speech
which merely posed a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" to
a trial, as opposed to a clear and present danger, the Nevada rule
violated the First Amendment. Gentile's first argument was accepted
by a 5-4 majority of the Court; his second was rejected by a different
5-4 majority.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority on the issue of vagueness, found that the Nevada rule had misled Gentile into thinking
that he could give his press conference without fear of discipline.' 7 In
so holding, Justice Kennedy cited subsection (3)(a) of the Rule, which
provided that a lawyer "may state without elaboration.., the general
nature of the ...defense," and that statements under that subsection

were protected "[n]otwithstanding subsection 1 [the general prohibition against statements that have a substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing a trial] and 2(a-f) [the section proscribing discussion of
the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a
witness]."'I8
Justice Kennedy explained that, given the grammatical structure of
the Rule and absent any clarifying interpretation by the state court,
the Rule failed to provide the requisite fair notice and guidance to a
lawyer seeking the protection of Rule 177(3)(a).I 9 In particular, Justice Kennedy found that the provision gave inadequate guidance because the terms "general" and "without elaboration" were classic
terms of degree, "which have no settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law."' 2° As such, the rule left Gentile with "no principle for
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 2739.
787 P.2d 386 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1990).
Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2731.
Id.
Id. at 2731.
Id.
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determining when his remarks [would] pass from the safe harbor of
the general to the forbidden sea of the elaborated."'" As confirmation
of the foregoing, Justice Kennedy cited the fact that Gentile had spent
several hours researching the requirements of the Nevada rule, and
that at his press conference, his remarks were guarded and general.
Justice Kennedy asserted that "the fact that Gentile was found in violation of the rules after studying them and making a conscious effort
at compliance demonstrates that [the Nevada rule] creates a trap for

the wary as well as the unwary. "22
The Court's 5-4 rejection of Gentile's second argument-that the
First Amendment requires a state to demonstrate a "clear and present
danger" of "actual prejudice or an imminent threat" rather than the
mere showing of "substantial likelihood of creating material prejudice" before sanctioning attorney speech-was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Chief Justice found that the less stringent
"substantial likelihood" test is a constitutionally permissible balancing of interests between lawyer and state because it is "designed to
protect the integrity and fairness of a state's judicial system, and 2it3
imposes only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers' speech."
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion confirmed the Court's earlier
suggestions that the First Amendment does not grant lawyers representing clients in pending cases the same latitude that it grants the
press. In so holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that "lawyers
representing clients in pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, and the state may demand some adherence to the
precepts of that system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct."' 24 The Chief Justice further noted that a lawyer's extrajudicial
statements can have a significant impact on a pending trial because
"lawyers' statements are likely to be received as especially authoritative," 25 and he emphasized that the sort of disciplinary rule at issue
was narrowly drawn to protect against the danger of an unfair trial
because it26"merely postpone[d] the attorney's comments until after
the trial."
21. Id.
22. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2732.
23. Id. at 2745.
24. Id. at 2744.
25. Id. at 2745.
26. Gentile, Ill S. Ct. at 2745. The remaining four justices expressed doubt, but
ultimately declared it unnecessary to decide whether the Nevada standard was constitutionally permissible, noting that the difference between a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" and a "clear and present danger" could prove to be "mere semantics," and
finding that the State, in any case, had not established that Gentile's statements rose to
the level of either standard. Id. at 2725.
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New York's DR 7-107

The current version of New York's restriction on attorney speechDisciplinary Rule 7-107 27-is substantially identical to the Nevada
rule that was at issue in Gentile.2" Subsection (a) of the New York
rule provides, as the Nevada rule did, a general prohibition against
making "an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding." 2 9
In addition, and again like the Nevada rule, subsections (b) and (c) of
the New York rule provide, respectively, a list of the sort of statements that "ordinarily" will be likely to materially prejudice an adjudicative proceeding, 30 and a "safe harbor" listing of statements that
may be made "without elaboration," among which is a statement
3I
about "the general nature of the claim or defense."
Thus, while the general standard stated in the first subsection of the
New York rule is one that Gentile found to be constitutionally permissible, the safe harbor provision contains precisely the same "trap for
27. N.Y.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 8.
28. New York's DR 7-107 was amended in 1990, prior to Gentile, to bring it substantially in accord with Rule 3.6 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.
29. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 8, DR 7-107(a).
30. The list of prohibited statements consists of statements about: (1) the character,
credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect or witness, or the identity of
a witness or the expected testimony of a party or witness; (2) the possibility of a plea of
guilty or the existence or contents of any confession, admission or statement given by the
accused or that person's refusal or failure to make a statement; (3) the performance or
results of any examination or tests or the accused's refusal or failure to submit to an
examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be
presented; (4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect; (5)
information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is inadmissible as evidence in a
trial and if disclosed would create substantial risk of material prejudice; (6) the fact that a
defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement
explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is innocent
until and unless proven guilty. N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra
note 8, DR 7-107(b).
31. The full text of the safe harbor provision is as follows:
(c) Provided that the statement complies with DR 7-107(a), a lawyer involved with the investigation or litigation of a matter may state the following
without elaboration:
(1) The general nature of the claim or defense.
(2) The information contained in a public record.
(3) That an investigation of the matter is in progress.
(4) The scheduling or result of any step in litigation.
(5) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto.
(6) A warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
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the wary as well as the unwary" that Gentile struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
Another problem with the current DR 7-107 is the inherent conflict
between subsection (b)(4), which prohibits a statement of opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and subsection (c)(1),
which permits a statement concerning the general nature of the claim
or defense. There can be nothing more "general" than the defense
counsel's statement that "my client is innocent," and yet that is the
very type of statement which appears to run afoul of subsection (b)(4).
Such a whipsaw effect undoubtedly violates the First Amendment
under the analysis in Gentile.
As a result, it is clear that New York's rule cannot be left as it
stands. The Committee notes that the ABA has come to the same
conclusion and is in the process of drafting an amendment to Model
Rule 3.6.32

Nor, of course, would it be an answer simply to delete the particular "safe harbor" that Gentile found to be fatally confusing. So
amended, the rule would consist of: (a) a general provision that could
bear widely differing interpretations; (b) a provision that essentially
prohibits an extremely broad class of statements, even if the statements are made well before the trial, and without any distinction between jury trials and bench trials; and (c) a list of "safe harbor"
statements that, by and large, are likely to be of interest only to the
prosecution.33 Such a rule would be neither fair, nor fairly described
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to
an individual or to the public interest.
(7) In a criminal case:
(i) The identity, age, residence occupation and family status of the accused.
(ii) If the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid
in apprehension of that person.
(iii) The fact, time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, use of weapons,
and a description of physical evidence seized, other than as contained only in a
confession, admission or statement.
(iv) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
N.Y. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 8, DR 7-107(c).
32. See generally Lynn S. Fulsome, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada: Trial in the Court
of Public Opinion and Coping With Model Rule 3.6- Where Do We Go From Here?, 37
VILL. L. REV. 619 (1992).
33. For example, the prosecution is far more likely to take advantage of safe harbor
provisions concerning information necessary to aid in apprehension of the accused, or
information concerning the evidence seized, than is the defense. See Monroe Freedman,
Muzzling Trial Publicity: New Rule Needed, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 5, 1993, at 24. The fact
that many of the safe harbor provisions are more often invoked by the prosecution does
not itself render the rule unconstitutional. See United States v. Cutler, 815 F. Supp. 599
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as "impos[ing] only narrow and necessary limitations on lawyers'
speech."'34 Accordingly, this Committee believes a more substantial
reworking of DR 7-107 is in order.
A.

The Timing of Statements

One obvious criterion for determining whether a statement creates
the necessary level of prejudice is the timing of the statement. A public statement made nine months before jury selection will obviously
have a lesser impact upon the jury venire than the same statement
made the day jury selection begins. This point was made by Justice
Kennedy, who argued in dissent in Gentile that the statements made
by Gentile were too far in advance of trial to create a substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the proceeding:
A statement which reaches the attention of the venire on the eve
of voir dire might require a continuance or cause difficulties in securing an impartial jury, and at the very least could complicate the
jury selection process .... As turned out to be the case here, exposure to the same statement six months prior to trial would not result in prejudice, the content fading in memory long before the trial
date.3 5
Indeed, in an analogous context, the Supreme Court has recognized
that pre-trial publicity is far less likely to prejudice the fairness of a
trial when it occurs substantially in advance of the trial. Thus, in
Patton v. Yount, 36 the defendant was convicted of murder, but the
state supreme court reversed the conviction on the ground that his
confession was illegally admitted and ordered a new trial. During the
first trial, there was extensive inflammatory publicity. Defendant was
convicted in a second trial, and argued that this conviction was
tainted by the publicity surrounding the first trial. The Court rejected
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the argument that the safe harbor provisions in Local Rule 7
of the Eastern District Rules of Court-substantially identical to the safe harbor provisions of DR 7-107-so favor prosecutorial speech as to violate the First Amendment;
noting that these matters "could be discussed by either party to the proceeding"). However, it does speak to a certain unfairness in the rule, especially when read in tandem with
the rule's broad and undifferentiated prohibition on pre-trial statements.
34. Gentile, II1 S. Ct. at 2745. No court has upheld an across-the-board prohibition
on attorney speech that applies regardless of its impact on the likelihood of influencing a
trial. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has held that since "a blanket prohibition on certain
areas of comment-a per se proscription-" without any consideration of the effect on a
fair trial grossly violates the First Amendment, statements by an attorney can only be
prohibited if they are likely to influence the jury. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,
522 F.2d 242, 251 (7th Cir. 1975).
35. Gentile, 111 S.Ct. at 2729.
36. 467 U.S. 1025 (1984).
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this argument, and emphasized that the defendant's second trial occurred four years after most of the publicity in connection with the
first trial. 3" The Court noted that the passage of time between publicity and a trial is a "highly relevant fact" 38 and concluded that "in the
circumstances of this case, we hold that [the passage of time] clearly
rebuts any presumption of partiality or prejudice" 39 stemming from
the inflammatory publicity. 4'
B. A Better Balancing of Interests
An ethical restriction on attorney statements that utilizes a "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" standard, or indeed any general standard, has a chilling effect on attorney statements. No
mechanism exists for obtaining an advisory opinion on whether particular statements would run afoul of the standard. Further, many
attorneys will be unwilling to run the risk of an adverse ruling, choosing instead simply to remain silent. At the very least, this chilling
effect casts doubt on the wisdom of an across-the-board prohibition of
speech that could be construed to violate a standard of "substantial
likelihood of material prejudice."
Although the shifting majorities in Gentile disagreed on a great
deal, the Justices were unanimous in affirming the public's interest in
not restricting the free flow of information about the criminal justice
system.4" The attorneys involved in a particular case are usually best
situated to alert the public to perceived abuses of power and to explain what has occurred in a particular case so that the public can
more effectively follow and monitor the workings of the criminal justice system. Those considerations militate against any ethical restriction on attorney speech that encourages attorneys to err on the side of
silence.
Moreover, an ethical restriction on attorney speech is not the only
means of regulating public statements that would imperil fair trial
rights. Trial judges have the power to issue "gag" orders when they
believe that unrestricted public statements might prevent a fair trial.42
It is true that, like ethical rules, gag orders are subject to First
Amendment limitations; the court must explore possible alternatives
to a restraint on speech, and the restraint must be narrowly tailored to
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
widely

Id. at 1031.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id. at 1035.
See Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2724, 2742.
See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. R. 7(c) (authorizing the trial court to issue a gag order "in a
publicized or sensational case").
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combat prejudicial publicity.3 The point, however, is that unlike a
broad, vague ethical restriction, a gag order can (and indeed must) be
tailored to the specific circumstances of each case; and such an order
can (and must) be accompanied by specific guidance to the attorney
on what sort of statements should be avoided.'
The gag order that was issued in the recent World Trade Center
bombing case illustrates how these orders can be particularized.4" Instead of allowing the attorneys to determine whether the vague standards of a disciplinary rule would be violated by pre-trial statements,
the trial judge imposed direct limitations on both the prosecution and
the defense. To the extent the limitations remained unclear, counsel
could seek, and indeed did seek, clarification from the judge who issued the order. To the extent the limitations on speech were considered onerous, counsel could and did seek to appeal the order; the
appeal was successful on First Amendment grounds.46 Thus, a gag
order is easier to clarify or challenge than an ambiguous disciplinary
rule. Assuming that some regulation of prejudicial pretrial publicity
is required in a particular case, a gag order is a more appropriate
means of regulation than a vague disciplinary rule.47 In light of the
availability of the gag order alternative, this Committee believes that a
broad ethical restriction on attorney speech is especially difficult to
justify.
To the extent that some ethical restriction on attorney speech is
necessary, we propose that the best approach is to identify the specific
circumstances under which attorney statements are most likely to imperil fair trial rights and to limit the ethical restriction only to those
circumstances. Where the risk of prejudice is minimal, or could be
effectively countered by voir dire or jury instructions or some other
remedy, we believe that it is better to have no prohibition at all, rather
than to have a general "substantial likelihood" standard, the applica43. See United States v. Salameh, 992 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1993) (vacating gag order
where restraint on attorneys' speech was not narrowly tailored and where trial court
failed to explore alternatives to gag order).
44. See id. (stating that order must be particularized to circumstances and narrowly
drawn).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See In re Application of Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding gag order prohibiting all participants in the Wedtech trial from making any statement
concerning the case, except to report courtroom and other proceedings). We do not propose or approve of the routine use of gag orders. Rather, we merely conclude that if there
is a problem of prejudicial publicity which imperils a fair trial, the use of a narrowly
tailored gag order is preferable to the after-the-fact application of a disciplinary rule
which uses broad language to limit speech.
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bility of which could never be accurately predicted by the attorney.4 8
C.

Bench Trials

While it is conceivable that an attorney's public statements could
unfairly influence a berich trial, the likelihood of that actually occurring is quite remote. In fact, as the Fourth Circuit has suggested in
Hirschkop v. Snead,4 9 a judge in a bench trial is presumed to disregard
evidence that she has ruled inadmissible, and it is therefore illogical to
conclude that the same judge is unable to disregard a lawyer's statements to the press.5" Accordingly, instead of broadly regulating statements pertaining to all "adjudicative proceedings," New York's rule
should be narrowed in scope to include only those statements pertaining to jury trials."
D.

Pre-Trial Statements

Whether statements made prior to trial will have an effect on the
empaneling of an impartial jury, or a jury's deliberations, obviously
depends both on the nature of the statements and on how far in advance of trial the statements were made. Conceivably, there may be
some statements so incendiary that they pose a substantial risk to a
fair trial regardless of how far in advance of trial they are uttered.
This is extremely unlikely, however, given the possibility of voir dire,
change of venue, and the use of jury instructions and peremptory
challenges. Also, it is worth remembering that the fair trial right is
48. The Committee notes that the enforcement of the "substantial likelihood of material prejudice" test has not been uniformly applied among the states. For example, in In
re Sullivan, 586 N.Y.S.2d 322 (App. Div. 1992), defense counsel gave a television interview after all the evidence in a highly publicized trial had been presented and before the
jury began deliberating. In the interview, the lawyer discussed the testimony of three
witnesses who did not testify at trial, including the defendant. He also charged that one
of the witnesses had been manipulated by the prosecution so that he would not testify for
the defense. The jury was not sequestered. Nonetheless, the court refused to impose any
disciplinary measures, reasoning that the lawyer's interview was "a mere drop in the
ocean of publicity," id. at 326, and "was not of a kind to so qualitatively alter public
knowledge or mood that he should have known it would carry a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing the proceeding." Id. Gentile, on the other hand, was disciplined
for statements made in a sea of publicity several months before the jury was even
empaneled.
49. 694 F.2d 356, 371 (4th Cir. 1979).
50. See also Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (stating that trial judges need not
be protected from pre-trial publicity because they are people of "fortitude, able to survive
in a hardy climate").
51. It is notable that Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Gentile, when discussing the
dangers of pre-trial publicity, focused exclusively on the danger of prejudicing the jury.
See 111 S. Ct. at 2738-45; see also Freedman, supra note 2, at 33 (arguing that bench
trials should be excluded from pre-trial publicity limitations).
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not implicated merely because the jurors have been subjected to publicity. The question instead is whether "the jurors had such fixed
opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the
52
defendant.
The most significant factor with respect to jury selection will often
be exposure to the charges, which are public. No ethical restrictions,
regardless of how severe, will prevent exposure to charges in a highly
publicized case. Therefore, the possibility of a tainted jury venire cannot ordinarily be a valid reason for limiting speech by attorneys. If
the jury venire has not been prejudiced by publicity given to the
charges, it is unlikely that there will be any statements by an attorney
that will prejudice the jury venire prior to jury selection.
From all these considerations, the Committee concludes that, in
most cases, pretrial statements are very unlikely to pose a substantial
risk to a fair trial unless they are made extremely close to the time of
trial. Accordingly, this Committee recommends that any general ethical regulation of pretrial statements be limited to statements made
one month or less prior to the scheduled commencement of trial.
In so recommending, the Committee does not, of course, intend to
suggest that a lawyer who makes a substantially prejudicial statement
several months prior to trial is any less worthy of reprimand than one
who does so two weeks prior to trial. Instead, our recommendation
merely reflects the belief that relatively few statements made more
than a month prior to trial are likely to pose a substantial risk of
material prejudice. Further, the desirability of promulgating an ethical restriction broad enough to encompass those few cases is outweighed by the general chilling effect on all attorney speech that such
a restriction would inevitably produce. A bright-line rule is especially
appropriate to provide clear guidance to attorneys in these
circumstances.5 3
Considering the various methods that are available to negate the
effects of prejudicial statements, the necessity of imposing any limits
on an attorney's pre-trial statements seems questionable. This is particularly true in light of Model Rule 3.5 and DR 1-102(A)(5). These
rules can be read as independently proscribing attorney conduct that
is intended to prejudice a trial. Why, then, is a rule relating to pre52. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899 (1991) (finding that extensive sensational
publicity did not violate the defendant's right to fair trial, and concluding that "it is not
required that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved").
53. See generally'Bruce A. Green, Zealous RepresentationBound. The Intersection of
the Ethical Codes and the CriminalLaw, 69 N.C. L. REV. 688 (1991) (arguing for the
adoption of "clear and explicit ethical rules").
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trial statements necessary? The short answer is that the existence of a
rule directed specifically to attorney statements makes clear that free
speech cannot justify the use of speech to prejudice a trial.
E. Statements Made During Trial
It is at the trial stage of the proceedings that attorneys' extrajudicial
statements pose the greatest threat to the fair administration of justice. As soon as jurors have been selected, their sensitivity to media
taint becomes more pronounced. Moreover, after jury selection the
exclusion of tainted jurors from the judicial process becomes markedly more difficult.
Still the Committee recognizes that the public's interest in news of
the trial is probably greatest while the trial is in progress, and that the
fundamental right of the public to information about the workings of
the criminal justice system calls for limiting the restrictions on speech
to only those absolutely necessary to insure a trial untainted by improper outside influences. To achieve this balance, the Committee,
for the reasons outlined above, recommends the replacement of the
"substantial likelihood" standard with a standard prohibiting only
that speech which presents a clear and present danger of prejudicing a
trial. While a broader standard such as "substantial likelihood" is
constitutionally permissible after Gentile, the Committee has concluded that the clear and present danger test strikes a better policy
balance, especially in light of the gag order alternative. If the trial
judge does not see the necessity of a gag order during the trial, we find
it difficult to conclude that discipline should be imposed on the basis
of a retrospective view that the attorney's speech was likely to prejudice the proceeding. Therefore, such discipline should be permissible
only in egregious circumstances where there is a clear and present
danger of prejudicing the trial.
The Committee notes the crucial role of the trial judge in governing
the conduct of the trial. The Committee does not advocate a listing of
presumptively improper speech in this portion of an amended rule.
We prefer to leave such determinations to the courts, given their
unique vantage point from which to fashion appropriate orders.
F. Post-Trial Statements
Since a jury's verdict obviously cannot be influenced once it has
been rendered, the rule should make clear that it does not apply to
statements made after the jury has been discharged. Disciplinary
Rule 7-107 as it exists today makes no reference whatsoever to the
timing of the proscribed statements. As the Chief Justice stated in
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Gentile, however, the rule is constitutionally permissible only because
it "merely postpones the attorney's comments until after the trial."54
IV.

The Proposed Rule

We propose that DR 7-107 be amended to read as follows:
During a jury trial, and during the month immediately preceding
the scheduled commencement of that trial, no lawyer participating
in or associated with that trial shall make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that it will present a clear and present danger of material prejudice to the trial.

So amended, the rule would encourage silence only when speech
would be truly likely to have an impact on the fairness of a trial. To
be sure, the result of such a rule might well be an increase in what
some would regard as undignified or even obnoxious speech. However, the chief article of faith of the First Amendment is that a society
is ultimately best served by giving voice to, not suppressing, its dissidents. And it is the view of this Committee that an area as critical as
the conduct of the criminal justice system is the last place in which
that article of faith should be abandoned.

54. Gentile, 111 S. Ct. at 2745. The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Holtzman,
78 N.Y.2d 184 (1991), upheld the imposition of discipline on the basis of post-trial comments made by a district attorney, in which the attorney criticized the performance of the
trial judge. No attempt was made in Holtzman to apply DR 7-107 to post-trial comments. Instead, the Court of Appeals held that Holtzman could be constitutionally disciplined under DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting conduct "prejudicial to the administration of
justice") and DR 1-102(A)(7) (prohibiting conduct "adversely reflecting on the lawyer's
fitness to practice law"). This Committee filed an amicus brief on behalf of the attorney
in Holtzman, and we continue to believe that the interest in protecting the integrity of the
judiciary is not so compelling as to outweigh the attorney's right to speak on matters of
public interest. Nonetheless, the practitioner should note that while DR 7-107 should
not limit post-trial statements, other even more nebulous provisions may be violated and
may subject the attorney to discipline.
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